Apoyo financiero surcoreano para la construcción de 3 SSK indonesios

Korea EximBank Supports $ 1.2 billion to Build Three Indonesian Submarines

Third submarine KRI Alugoro (photo : Kemhan)

Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. Ltd. has announced that Korea Eximbank will provide $ 1.2 billion in construction costs for three submarines exported to Indonesia.

The Korea Export-Import Bank is ready to fund the construction of the submarine, according to a report by the defense industry specialist Media World Net. According to reports, the Export-Import Bank will provide funds to the Indonesian Treasury Department in the form of a loan, and the Indonesian Treasury will support the funds to the PT PAL Shipyard.

"We are expecting the funding rate to be lower than that of the first submarine because the Ministry of Finance appreciates the investment grade of Indonesia well," said Ilian Thorntal, Director of Treasury Finance at the Surabaya Office.

On April 12, DSME ordered three Type 209-1400 submarines from Indonesia for $ 1.2 billion and jointly with Indonesian shipyard PT PAL. Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. will be delivered to the Indonesian Navy by the first half of 2026 through joint construction with Indonesian PT. PAL shipyard as in the first project.

The submarine to be built jointly by DSME is 61m long and can carry 40 crew members. It also has eight launchers that can launch various torpedoes, mines, and missiles. Submarine drying starts at the end of the year as soon as DSME is ready.

Previously, DSME and PT PAL were built in Korea in the Type 209-1400, and the last submarine made a block in Korea and finally assembled at the Indonesian PT PAL shipyard in Suarabaya - Indonesia. The first ship Nagapasa is going out, the second ship is Ardadedali, and the third ship is an Alugoro. The No. 1 and No. 2 vessels have already been commissioned to the Indonesian Navy, while the No. 3 vessels are undergoing marine navigation tests.

Global Biz 24

Nadie quiere ayudar a reconstruir Siria

No One Wants to Help Bashar al-Assad Rebuild Syria

The Syrian president appears comfortably in power, but his supporters in Moscow can’t afford to pay for reconstruction; his adversaries in the West can, but won’t.

Krishnadev Calamur |  The Atlantic

A Syrian Democratic Forces fighter walks down an empty street in As Susah, Syria, on February 16. CHRIS MCGRATH / GETTY


When the Syrian conflict began, in March 2011, Bashar al-Assad seemed likely to be ousted, like other strongmen swept away by the Arab Spring. Eight years later, Assad is still president, but of a fractured, demolished country. Now one big question is: Who will pay to rebuild Syria?

The bill is large. The United Nations estimates the cost of reconstruction at $250 billion (about four times Syria’s prewar GDP, or roughly the size of Egypt’s economy). Russia wants the West to pay up; its military support is essential to the Assad regime’s survival, but it has its own economic constraints. However, the United States and its Western allies have adamantly refused, absent meaningful political changes. There would be “no reconstruction without [a] political transition,” a French embassy spokeswoman recently told me. Last fall, Nikki Haley, then the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, dismissed as “absurd” Russia’s push for Western support. That leaves 18 million people, about a third of whom are refugees, facing an uncertain future in a country that’s far worse off now than it was when the conflict began. Reconstruction remains essential despite Donald Trump’s withdrawal of most U.S. troops, signaling Washington’s little appetite for further engagement in Syria.

Theoretically, a successful reconstruction effort could see millions of displaced Syrians returning home. (Of course, the problem of security inside Syria would remain.) But as long as parts of the country remain unlivable, the refugee crisis that has gripped Europe for the past few years risks exacerbation, potentially subjecting many more generations of Syrians to living in refugee camps at the mercy of often unfriendly host countries.

Russia, which intervened in the conflict in 2015 and is keen to preserve its newfound regional influence, can’t take on the cost of reconstruction. Its economy is in tatters, made worse by sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and its interference in the 2016 U.S. elections; the threat of further punitive measures over its seizure in November of Ukrainian vessels near the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, which both countries share under a 2003 treaty; and low oil prices. But Moscow has tried, with no success, to get the international community to pay.


The U.S. and Europe have made reforms, including a political transition, a precondition for any role in reconstruction. They are also banking on the fact that Assad’s main backers, both internal and external, will realize that ongoing support for him will keep the purse strings closed.

“Assad is a principal obstacle to rehabilitation of Syria, and eventually the Alawite business class and those who support the regime externally will find that he’s a liability and an albatross that will grow,” a Western diplomat recently told The Atlantic. The diplomat added, “I’m told that before the war, the capital budget was $60 billion, and last year the capital budget was $300 million, of which only 20 percent was actually spent. Not only does it not have the money, but they don’t have administrative [or] political capacity to build the country.”

For years, the West has pressed Russia to compel Assad to make concessions.

“The issue really is, how much power do [the Russians] have to force real reforms, actual reforms that devolve power away from Damascus, that decentralize power somewhat?” Mona Yacoubian, who studies Syria at the U.S. Institute of Peace, told me in a recent interview. “And here, it’s not at all clear that Russia has that kind of leverage.”

The irony is, the very focus on reconstruction is tacit acknowledgment that Assad isn’t going anywhere. Russia’s and Iran’s continued support, the U.S. withdrawal of the majority of American forces, and the beginning of some rehabilitation among Arab countries give Assad few incentives to make political concessions. But even from this seemingly comfortable perch, Assad is in a bind. His supporters can’t afford to pay for reconstruction; his adversaries in the West can, but won’t. Iran, Assad’s other principal supporter, is suffering from reimposed U.S. sanctions and doesn’t have that much to spare.

Yet much needs to be rebuilt. About 11 million people have been displaced and lost their home. The fighting has devastated water, sanitation, and electrical systems in former rebel-held areas. Schools and hospitals have been razed. Large cities like Raqqa have been flattened. In rural areas, irrigation channels are no longer functioning; grain silos have been destroyed.

“The infrastructure needs in northeast Syria are a mess,” Made Ferguson, the deputy director for Syria at Mercy Corps, the humanitarian-aid agency, and who is based in northeast Syria, told me last month. “Basically, everything is needed.”

This puts the West in a quandary. On the one hand, it doesn’t want to reward Assad by rebuilding Syria and cementing his hold on power. On the other, it doesn’t want to ignore a humanitarian situation that will likely get worse without a massive infusion of funds. (On Thursday, international donors pledged almost $7 billion, including $397 million from the United States, for civilians affected by the conflict. The overall figure fell far short of what the EU said was needed.)

Syrian government officials say they welcome investment only from those “friendly countries” that supported the regime during the conflict. There aren’t many candidates: Some of Syria’s Arab neighbors, who broke with Assad over the conflict, are slowly warming to the regime, but they are also reluctant to pour billions into an effort that ultimately could strengthen Iran. Turkey, a regional economic power, is engaged in reconstruction in the parts of Syria that it controls, and has ambitions outside these areas as well. The Syrian regime wants China, a major actor in infrastructure projects worldwide, to get involved. But for any of these countries to participate, Syria first needs to be stable. That’s far from assured.

Syria’s civil war has metastasized into a conflict with Israel, Turkey, Iran, and the Kurds. The planned U.S. withdrawal compounds the uncertainty. Economic malaise has worsened since the conflict began, as have human indicators like life expectancy.

Political freedoms, the lack of which first sparked the protests against the regime, still do not exist. The Islamic State remains a threat, even if it’s about to lose all its territory. The impasse over reconstruction will only serve to widen these fissures.

“Either the international community has to accept that Assad won the war and begin to approach reconstruction from that framework,” Nicholas Heras, a Syria expert at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington, D.C., told me recently, “or they will have to live with the risk of endemic instability and governance gaps in large areas of the core Middle East.”

China ya estaría negociando con Guaidó

China habla con Guaidó para proteger sus inversiones en Venezuela, según WSJ

El gobierno de Pekín estaría adelantando un diálogo con el gobierno interino de ezuela de Juan Guaidó para proteger sus inversiones en caso de la caída de Maduro, según reveló The Wall Street Journal.


Juan Guaidó, presidente interino de Venezuela. Foto: Getty Images

Dinero

La República Popular de China ha estado teniendo conversaciones con la oposición venezolana, a través del gobierno del presidente interino Juan Guaidó, para mantener a salvo sus inversiones en medio de la crisis que afronta el país y jugando todas las cartas posibles mientras aumenta la presión sobre Nicolás Maduro, para el que Pekín ha sido un aliado, según The Wall Street Journal.

Dice un reporte hecho por el medio que los diplomáticos chinos, preocupados por el futuro de sus proyectos petroleros en el país sudamericano y la deuda de casi US$20.000 millones que Caracas tiene con Pekín, han mantenido negociaciones de deuda en Washington en las últimas semanas con representantes de Guaidó, que encabeza los esfuerzos respaldados por la mayoría de la comunidad internacional para expulsar a Maduro, según indicaron fuentes cercanas a los diálogos.

Las conversaciones son una señal de los temores que se han formado entre los simpatizantes del gobierno socialista de Venezuela.

Durante casi dos décadas, los préstamos de Venezuela con China y Rusia a cambio de petróleo han brindado un apoyo vital para mantener el régimen venezolano.

Las relaciones florecieron desde los mandatos de Hugo Chávez, quien fortaleció los lazos con esos países, así como Cuba, Irán e incluso la India en un esfuerzo por combatir el “imperialismo” de los Estados Unidos.

Pero los lazos comerciales y financieros con estos países se han tensionado desde que Maduro, el sucesor elegido por Chávez, tomó el poder en 2013 y la economía comenzó a disminuir, con la producción de petróleo cayendo a más de la mitad mitad después de años de malas decisiones.

Las sanciones impuestas por Washington el mes pasado a la industria petrolera de Venezuela han desesperado a Maduro, al ser asfixiado con su mayor fuerte de ingresos y proyectando nuevas caídas en la producción de petróleo.

Según The Wall Street Journal, la Cancillería de China no respondió a una solicitud de comentarios sobre los presuntos contactos que ha tenido Pekín con la oposición venezolana. En las últimas semanas, el ministerio ha sugerido que se están llevando a cabo discusiones y que China quiere que se respeten sus intereses.

Al ser consultado sobre el rumor de conversaciones en una reunión informativa el 1 de febrero, el vocero del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Geng Shuang, dijo que Beijing "ha estado en estrecha comunicación con todas las partes de diversas maneras sobre la situación en Venezuela".

"No importa cómo evolucione la situación, la cooperación entre China y Venezuela no debe ser socavada", dijo.

Entre tanto, Guaidó ha extendido públicamente su invitación a China y Rusia. El presidente de la Asamblea Nacional, elegido para comandar una presidencia interina “hacia una transición a la democracia”, ha argumentado que el cambio político es el camino hacia las reformas económicas necesarias para restablecer la estabilidad.

Adiós Chavismo: Avanza plan Marshall para Venezuela

Avanza ‘Plan Marshall’ para apoyar al gobierno paralelo de Venezuela

El equipo venezolano que planifica la transición negocia un acuerdo stand-by con el FMI de u$s 2000 millones, y además gestionan otros u$s 60.000 millones para los próximos cinco años. También confían en recibir u$s 20.000 en donaciones de EE.UU., Canadá y Europa, mientras que los países que ya reconocieron a Guaidó como presidente interino le prometieron u$s 2000 millones.

Por M. Vallejos # El Cronista





El líder parlamentario de Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, avanza en sus gestiones internacionales para acelerar un cambio de gobierno en ese país, lo cual requiere fundamentalmente de ayuda económica, que está gestionando un equipo que planifica la eventual transición.

El equipo obtuvo una ayuda de u$s 2000 millones en ayuda humanitaria que podrá ser utilizada en los primeros 90 días de la transición, y que le proveerán algunos países que respaldan a Guaidó como presidente interino venezolano: Brasil, Colombia, EE.UU, y parte de la Unión Europea, detalló el diputado opositor José Guerra al diario Valor.



Además, el equipo negocia otros u$s 2000 millones con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) como acuerdo stand-by que se pondrán a disposición en el primer día de transición para promover una estabilización cambiaria, añadió Guerra, que asesora a Guaidó en el plan de transición.

Pero hay más: según Valor, el equipo de transición negocia con el FMI otros u$s 60.000 millones, que serían desembolsados a lo largo de cinco años.

Otro legislador del equipo de Guaidó -que prefirió el anonimato- añadió que también buscan donaciones por un total de u$s 20.000 en EE.UU., Canadá y Europa.

"Para contener la hiperinflación lo más rápido posible, necesitamos crédito internacional con organismos como el FMI, el Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina (CAF), el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) y el Banco Mundial", dijo sobre la inflación anual estimada por el FMI para el 2019 en 10.000.000%.