Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta geoestrategia. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta geoestrategia. Mostrar todas las entradas

viernes, 23 de octubre de 2020

Primer submarino de Myanmar provisto por India

 Primer submarino de Myanmar participa en el ejercicio de la flota de Bandoola

Times of India
 

 

UMS Min Ye Thein Kha Thu primer submarino de la Armada de Myanmar (todas las fotos: Myawady)

Con la mirada puesta en China, India entrega un submarino a Myanmar


NUEVA DELHI: En un movimiento importante que se produce en medio de la confrontación militar en curso en el este de Ladakh, India ha entregado uno de sus submarinos diesel-eléctricos a Myanmar para contrarrestar los avances estratégicos de China en la región.

Myanmar encargó el submarino INS Sindhuvir de 3.000 toneladas, rebautizándolo como UMS Min Ye Thein Kha Thu, e incluso lo desplegó durante el ejercicio de la flota "Bandoola" del país, que fue inspeccionado por el comandante en jefe, el general senior Min Aung Hlaing el jueves.


 

TOI en diciembre del año pasado había informado que todas las cubiertas habían sido despejadas para que Myanmar comisionara al INS Sindhuvir, con sus marineros listos para entrenar en las complejas operaciones de combate subacuático en el submarino desde marzo-abril en adelante este año.

El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores anunció oficialmente el jueves la decisión de entregar INS Sindhuvir a Myanmar. El submarino de origen ruso tiene 31 años, pero el año pasado se sometió a una amplia remodelación y modernización en Hindustan Shipyard Limited en Visakhapatnam.

martes, 1 de enero de 2019

Rusia despliega sus activos nucleares

Russia continues to develop its strategic missile forces

Army Recognition


Russia`s Strategic Missile Forces (Raketniye Voyska Strategisheskogo Naznacheniya, RVSN) will receive some 100 new weapon systems, including the RS-24 Yars (NATO reporting name: SS-27 mod 2 or SS-29 ) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in mobile and silo-based configurations, by the end of 2018, Commander of the service Colonel General Sergey Karakayev said on December 17.


Russian RS-24 Yars mobile ICBM InterContinental Ballistic Missile. (Picture source Global Look Press)

The deliveries will allow the RVSN to rearm a missile regiment of the Yoshkar-Ola Missile Division with mobile launchers of the RS-24 Yars ICBM and continue the refitting of the Kozelsk Missile Division, the general said. According to him, a missile range of the Dombarovo formation will get the first Avangard gliding reentry vehicles mounted on the UR-100N UTTKh ICBMs in 2019. The NPO Mashinostroyenia Corporation has already launched the manufacturing of the Avangard. "We are to make a missile regiment comprising a modified command and control post and two silo-based launchers operational in the Dombarovo Missile Division next year," said Karakayev. According to him, the Avangard will shore up the capabilities of the RVSN in terms of missile defense penetration and point strikes.

The service`s ICBMs feature a relatively short active flight trajectory and are equipped with the newest countermeasure systems that suppress any missile defense. "We have hammered out some technical solutions that counterbalance the advanced U.S. missile defence system that has been deployed to Europe. The maneuver performance of the missiles will also be enhanced," said Karakayev.

Russian industry is developing a new silo-based strategic missile system armed with the Sarmat liquid-fuel ICBM. The Uzhurskaya Missile Division is planned to be the first RVSN`s formation that will receive the weapon in 2021. The ICBM has already passed through its drop tests and confirmed the capabilities of its launch systems, silo-based launcher and engine. The flights tests of the Sarmat will be conducted at the Plesetsk space range and then in the Uzhurskaya Missile Division.

At an extended meeting of the Ministry of Defence`s panel held on December 18, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the erection of infrastructure for the Yars ICBMs was being continued. "Six missile regiments have already received fully equipped launch pads for the weapons and seven more regiments feature pieces of infrastructure required for operating the weapons," Shoigu said.

In 2019, the RVSN will make 31 launchers of the Yars ICBMs and the Avangard vehicles operational.

The proportion of modern hardware in service with the RVSN has reached 70%. This figure will increase to 76% by the end of 2019.

domingo, 29 de julio de 2018

USA preocupada por la base china en Neuquén

El New York Times alerta sobre la base construida por el ejército chino en la Patagonia 

El prestigioso periódico norteamericano sostiene que la supuesta "base espacial" de la provincia de Neuquén podría esconder fines de espionaje y asegura que "China expande su influencia en América Latina"


Infobae



La estación espacial china en Bajada del Agrio, Neuquén

Con una altura similar a un edificio de 16 pisos, la antena de 450 toneladas contrasta con el inhóspito paisaje patagónico de la pequeña localidad de Bajada del Agrio, en Neuquén. Construida por el ejército chino en tiempo récord y concebida en el más absoluto secreto, la estación "espacial" china generó suspicacias y fundadas sospechas desde sus inicios, tal como publicó Infobae en reiteradas oportunidades.

Y es que, con un costo de 50 millones de dólares, el dispositivo principal de la supuesta estación de control de la misión espacial china podría tener múltiples usos militares y de espionaje, algo que -según publica este sábado el New York Times– genera intranquilidad tanto en los pobladores locales como en líderes de la región e, incluso, en Washington.

 

La estación, que comenzó a operar en marzo, "es uno de los símbolos más llamativos del largo impulso de Beijing para transformar a América Latina y configurar su futuro para las generaciones venideras", sostiene el periódico estadounidense. Supuestamente, tiene como finalidad principal dar apoyo a la expedición china hacia el lado oculto de la luna, una empresa ambiciosa que los funcionarios argentinos apoyan, tal vez con cierta ingenuidad. La misión hacia el otro lado de la luna, que nunca se enfrenta a la Tierra, tiene fecha de lanzamiento programada para este año, y si se concretara podría despejar el camino hacia la extracción de helio 3, que algunos científicos creen que podría proporcionar una fuente de energía limpia y revolucionaria.


 
(Télam)

El predio de 200 hectáreas está bajo el control de Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), una división de las fuerzas armadas chinas que explotará durante los próximos 50 años la base. También la ubicación surgió luego de meses de negociaciones secretas entre la provincia de Neuquén y el gobierno chino, que culminaron con la firma de un acuerdo en noviembre de 2012 por el cual el gobierno comunista dispondrá de las tierras sin pagar alquiler.

 
(Télam)


El proyecto surgió como parte de las negociaciones secretas que la Argentina mantuvo con China durante la presidencia de Cristina Kirchner, en momentos es que el país necesitaba desesperadamente inversiones y el conflicto con los holdouts limitaba el acceso a los mercados internacionales de crédito. Eran años en los que la sequía limitaba además el ingreso de divisas, hasta que apareció un "swap" de monedas milagroso, acompañado por un amplio programa ferroviario. "Pero mientras extendía una mano de ayuda, China comenzó las negociaciones secretas que condujeron a la estación de control espacial y satelital en la Patagonia", cuenta el periódico.


 
(Télam)

Más allá de las especulaciones, lo seguro es que la antena mejora la capacidad de China de realizar tareas de inteligencia en el hemisferio, además de tener muchos usos estratégicos. Para Frank A. Rose, secretario de Estado adjunto para el control de armamentos durante la administración Obama, China desarrolló una sofisticada tecnología para bloquear, interrumpir y destruir satélites en los últimos años. "Una antena gigante es como una aspiradora gigante", dijo Dean Cheng, un ex investigador del Congreso que estudia la política de seguridad nacional de China, al Times. "Lo que están absorbiendo son señales, datos, todo tipo de cosas".

 
(Télam)

El vocero del Pentágono, teniente coronel Christopher Logan, explicó que el Ejército estadounidenses está evaluando las implicaciones de la estación de monitoreo china, mientras que las autoridades chinas rechazaron las solicitudes de entrevistas sobre la base y su programa espacial.

El avance chino desató un debate sobre los riesgos que implica la alianza estratégica. Según el Times, "China ha estado llevando a cabo discretamente un plan propio de gran alcance en toda América Latina".

 

Así, la construcción de la base se da un contexto de crecimiento exponencial del comercio, el rescate a gobiernos latinoamericanos en apuros y la construcción de monumentales obras de infraestructura, además del fortalecimiento de la cooperación militar. Es decir, enormes cantidades de recursos destinado a varios países de la región -principalmente, Brasil, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay y Bolivia-, que durante la primera década del siglo XXI estuvo bajo gobiernos populistas deseoso de mostrarse distantes de los Estados Unidos, muchas veces sin realizar una evaluación de los costos actuales y futuros que eso implica.

Aun con el giro hacia el centro que varios países han hecho en los últimos años, la expansión china en la región no ha sido puesta en duda.

Y es que no sólo el comercio se ha más que duplicado en una década: China también ha otorgado decenas de miles de millones de dólares en préstamos, que en casos como el de Ecuador estuvieron respaldados por las reservas petroleras, una decisión del ex presidente Rafael Correa que los fiscales creen que podría haber perjudicado los intereses nacionales, por lo que se encuentran actualmente investigando esos contratos.

 
 (Télam)

China "ayudó a la región a tener su mayor crecimiento desde los años 70", le dijo Kevin P. Gallagher, economista de la Universidad de Boston, al Times, que agrega que "la alianza dio sus frutos, ayudando a impulsar a América Latina al tipo de tasas de crecimiento que envidiaron Europa y Estados Unidos".

Para el especialista Evan Ellis, profesor de estudios latinoamericanos en el Army War College de los Estados Unidos, "se llega a un punto en el que no se puede negar la posibilidad de que las fuerzas chinas operen desde bases en la región".

Poco después de haber sido nombrado a fines de 2015, el embajador argentino en China Diego Guelar dijo que renegociaría el acuerdo de la estación espacial porque el anterior gobierno "había regalado demasiado", al no especificar que la base podría usarse solo para fines pacíficos y "en cualquier momento podría convertirse en una base militar".

Si bien los chinos acordaron la base de uso únicamente para fines civiles, los pobladores de Bajada del Agrio, la ciudad más cercana a la estación, tienen miedo de un posible uso militar.

sábado, 7 de julio de 2018

India y Vietnam cooperan contra China

India And Vietnam Are Teaming Up Versus China

21st Century Asian Arms Race



 

Pictured is Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman standing between two Vietnamese Su-30MK pilots who are also twin brothers. Via Raksha Mantri/Ministry of Defense.

India’s defense minister led a delegation in a three-day visit to Vietnam that lasted from June 13 until 15. No less than President Tran Dai Quang welcomed Nirmala Sitharaman in Hanoi on the day after she arrived. The purpose of her trip was never explicitly stated although its aim was clear enough–to strengthen Delhi’s budding alliance with Hanoi as a counter-balance against China.

In the course of her visit Sitharaman was shown aboard a Vietnamese warship in Cam Ranh Bay and toured an airbase. She also attended two events that revealed the depth of India’s commitment to Vietnam. By the end of her trip it was obvious India wants its staunchest ally in Southeast Asia to strengthen its domestic military industries.



Vietnam’s state-owned media immediately produced bland reportage on Sitharaman’s activities. But a close reading of news about her visit to Hanoi’s own defense ministry on June 13 sheds some light on what exactly transpired. During a meeting with her counterpart Ngo Xuan Lich it was agreed that both sides will continue their “comprehensive strategic partnership,” a term used for an arrangement where India transfers both military capabilities and skills to its regional partner. The extent of this partnership was described by Vietnamese media as:


The two…reviewed the recent results of bilateral defense cooperation and agreed on the direction and measures to boost defense cooperation in the coming time. The two ministers stressed the need to continue the existing cooperation mechanisms like the Deputy-Ministerial level dialogue, consultations for officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force service. They discussed cooperation areas between arms and services, training, defense industry, strategic research, war consequence relief and UN peacekeeping operations.

It was later revealed that Sitharaman and her delegation held a conference with defense ministry officials to establish new goals for the strategic partnership. The following day, on June 14, Sitharaman met with President Tran and briefed him on the conference’s salient points. According to Vietnamese media there are now three areas where both countries are cooperating. The first is continuing the established cross-training schedule where Indian military personnel are sent to Vietnam as instructors. The second is related to an information technology enterprise. Third and last is connected to Vietnam’s own fledgling defense industry.

…Sitharaman briefed the host upon the outcomes of the talks held earlier, which emphasized the importance of maintaining and expanding cooperation in training and IT and defense industry development. She affirmed that India always treasures and wants to beef up the comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam. She also stressed that there is still much room for Vietnam and India to boost cooperation, especially in the realm of security-defense.

In relation to the second and third objectives Sitharaman did attend a groundbreaking ceremony on June 13 at a location in Nha Trang called the “Army Software Park.” She also delivered a speech at an evening function of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) on June 14 where she announced that Indian companies were prepared for joint ventures with Vietnamese firms. Vietnamese media did mention at least 16 Indian companies joined Sitharaman in Hanoi. A real breakthrough for India, however, was Sitharaman’s announcement that Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) was opening a local office.

Vietnamese media even hinted that both countries might soon be jointly producing military equipment:

At the event, the two sides discussed a wide range of topic including research collaboration, design – manufacturing, technological transfer, defense goods purchase, and cooperation in defense industry and human resources training.

Sixteen companies from India introduced their outstanding research studies in suggestion for bilateral partnerships.

BEL is a state-owned company specializing in computerized subsystems for aircraft, armored vehicles, and ships. If Vietnamese companies are receiving licenses to assemble products made by BEL isn’t clear yet, but the possibility of Indian communication tools, electronic warfare jammers, and radars being used in Vietnam should worry Beijing. It’s bad enough that Hanoi is rumored to have dibs on BrahMos supersonic missiles, but if Indian manufacturers open local factories then China must entice the Vietnamese with more warm diplomacy.

What Sitharaman’s trip to Vietnam proves is India does have its own strategic roadmap for surrounding China–aside from its role in the Quad Alliance–and Southeast Asia must accept it’s now a contested region between Asia’s two emerging giants.

miércoles, 3 de enero de 2018

Alemania y Suiza hacen ferrocarril que une Brasil con Perú, esquivando Chile

Germany and Switzerland to help build coast-to-coast railway in South America

Bolivian President Evo Morales visited Switzerland to sign an agreement to construct a railway line across the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Supporters say the project will boost trade and create jobs.



Bolivian President Morales and Swiss President Leuthard meeting in Bern

South America's new transcontinental railway is considered to be one the biggest infrastructure projects of the century and is also known as the "Panama Canal on railway tracks." A 3,755-kilometer land connection is set to be built between the continent's Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

Bolivia is a landlocked country, so the Andean nation is especially keen on getting the ball rolling soon. Bolivian President Evo Morales met Swiss President Doris Leuthard to sign a memorandum of understanding on the construction of the transcontinental railway.

Morales met with representatives of German and Swiss railway firms, and Germany's State Secretary of Transport, Building and Urban Development, Rainer Bomba. After the meeting, Bolivia's president tweeted, "Our meeting with the Swiss-German consortium was very productive. (...) In January, the technical secretariat begins its work."





The transcontinental railway will connect three South American countries: Brazil, Bolivia and Peru. The line will run from the Brazilian port city of Santos on the Atlantic coast through Bolivia to the Peruvian port city of Ilo on the Pacific coast. Other South American countries including Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay are interested in a connection as well.

"The transcontinental railway is an important geostrategic project for South American countries," says economist José Alberti from the Bolivian export association CADEX in an interview with DW. "It will improve integration and infrastructures on the continent, foster transatlantic networking and make access to Asia better." Alberti points out that "this project will reduce time and costs. Furthermore, new services will be created with respect to international trade and they will boost the competitiveness of the countries in the region."


The planned route starts on the eastern coast of Peru and stretches across Bolivia on its way to Brazil's eastern coast at Santos

Faster trade route to China


Apart from bolstering South America's domestic market, the transcontinental railway has been designed to transport goods across South America and out of the continent - especially to China, which is already Brazil's largest trading partner and most important export market, apart from the USA. According to a study conducted by the South American infrastructure initiative IIRSA, the time needed for transport between Brazil and China will be cut significantly from 67 to 42 days compared with the route through the Panama Canal.

"Rapid access to the Pacific Ocean and Asian markets is extremely important for Brazilian exports. But the same is true the other way around," says Paula Pena, a historian and museum director from Santa Cruz in Bolivia. "The train will not only pay off because of the transport of goods but also passenger travel. Imagine Europe without a decent railway route - that is our reality."

"It is a project with consequences that reach far beyond the economy," says José Alberti. "It will have a major impact on society, as it will also create many new jobs." The economist says that starting in 2050, millions of tons of goods will be transported annually on the railway line.

German and Swiss experts are in demand


Around half of the line will run across Brazil, 340 kilometers on Peruvian soil and 1,521 kilometers will run through Bolivia. The train will have to travel across rough terrain: mountain slopes in the Andes, rivers and flood-prone regions.

The environmental challenges are exactly why Bolivian President Morales is interested in the extensive expertise that Switzerland and Germany are known for. It is expected that German and Swiss companies will help work on construction and also provide material and maintenance.

All three South American countries have greenlighted the project. The new train line will be inaugurated in 2025, just in time for the 200th anniversary of Bolivia's independence.



viernes, 15 de julio de 2016

Indonesia mira al Mar del Sur de China

Indonesia and the South China Sea
Annoyed in Natuna

China turns a would-be peacemaker into yet another rival
The Economist



ON JUNE 23rd Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo, flew to the Natuna archipelago in the South China Sea, along with several ministers, to hold a cabinet meeting on board a warship patrolling the surrounding waters. Only days earlier the same warship had fired warning shots at Chinese trawlers, detaining one of them and its crew, in the latest sign of escalating tensions in the area. Mr Joko, universally known as Jokowi, wanted to send a message to China.

Indonesian diplomats might once have registered their objections in private. But Jokowi has criticised China more openly than his predecessors. After one clash in March, when a Chinese coastguard vessel freed a Chinese trawler from the Indonesian patrol boat that had caught it, Jokowi summoned China’s ambassador for a scolding. The recent visit to the warship was Jokowi’s most public display of sovereignty yet.

It marks a sharp shift for Indonesia, which for decades positioned itself as a regional peacemaker. Unlike other South-East Asian maritime countries, it claims none of the contested rocks, reefs or islands in the South China Sea. China recognises Indonesian sovereignty over the Natuna islands themselves. But its “nine-dash line” overlaps with Indonesia’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone surrounding the islands. Luhut Panjaitan, Jokowi’s chief security minister, says that the government’s position is simple: it does not recognise that claim. But Yohanes Sulaiman, a lecturer in government studies at Jenderal Achmad Yani University in Bandung, reckons Indonesia’s policy towards China still lacks clarity.

Indonesia’s foreign-affairs ministry cheerily insists there is no dispute, even as China’s foreign ministry referred to “overlapping claims for maritime rights and interests” in a statement condemning Indonesia’s actions during the latest skirmish off the Natunas. The thinking seems to be that acknowledging a dispute would both provoke China, which Jokowi sees as a crucial source of trade and investment, and lend credence to its claims. But Indonesia’s uncertain stance seems to be encouraging China to encroach farther into its waters.

Whether Indonesia’s armed forces are up to the job remains unclear. Although the country is building up its defences on the Natunas, Ryamizard Ryacudu, the defence minister, seems more preoccupied with fighting the phantom threat of homosexuals and others he imagines are waging a “proxy war” than facing up to the real risk of conflict.

Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts to check Chinese expansion have floundered. Earlier this month foreign ministers from the ten-nation Association of South-East Asian Nations—of which Indonesia is by far the largest member—issued an unusually strong statement expressing “serious concerns” over developments that “have the potential to undermine peace, security and stability”, only to retract it hours later.

On July 12th an international tribunal in The Hague will rule on a petition brought by the Philippines intended to show that China’s claims have no legal basis. Indonesia will be watching closely, and insists that the ruling be respected. Mr Panjaitan is proud of his country’s good (for now) relations with China. But, he says, “we don’t want to be dictated to by any country about our sovereignty.”